Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I’ve submitted a lengthy written statement and look forward to

the opportunity for questions and trying to respond to them. And

I deeply appreciate the interest of the members of this committee

in the terrible situation that is ongoing in Sudan.

Rather than go through my written statement, I’d like to make

just a few observations, including regarding the dialog that’s now

going on, which was in the New York Times last week.

First, I think it’s important to recognize that there are a lot of

bad actors in Sudan, in Darfur. The government, in its reply to a

rebel attack in 2003, opened the gates of hell. Since then, the Arab

militia, the Janjaweed, the ‘‘devils on horseback,’’ sometimes in coordinated

attacks with the government now, sometimes on their

own, are engaged in terrible acts, and rebels also—rebel movements

are also engaged in acts that harm innocent civilians.

I have a slightly different take on the question of whether or not

there’s a peace to keep. I first became involved in U.N. peacekeeping

over 25 years ago, in my first ambassadorship. I think, in

my opinion, in Sudan you will not move to peace until you change

facts on the ground. And a key to changing facts on the ground is

moving to some—more toward sustainable stability.

I agree with you, Mr. Chairman, I think the deployment of the

EUFOR forces are important. Those 3,700 European forces, and

their activity on the Chad border is important to gain security.

That’s why, last Monday, I had discussions in Paris, including with

Foreign Minister Kouchner exactly about that, because the bleedin

of violence in Chad into Darfur, and the bleed-in of violence from

Sudan into Chad, are interlinked, and progress has to be made on

both sides.

Further, I—and so, the deployment—and I hope I have a chance

to discuss the particulars—of these peacekeepers are very urgent.

They are not ‘‘the’’ answer in Darfur, they are not ‘‘the’’ answer for

peace, but they will contribute to more stability. It will crowd out

the space in which bad actors can be perpetuating atrocities, insecurity,

preventing humanitarian assistance to flow, et cetera.

Second, I agree with you, Mr. Chairman and others who have

commented, that there needs to be progress on a political solution.

I cannot sit here and say I am optimistic that we are making that

progress. I am in frequent contact with my old friend Jan Eliasson,

the U.N. mediator; in fact, talked to him this morning about his

most recent trip. And we, of course, support Ambassador Eliasson

and AU Representative Salim in their efforts.

But, if I can, let me just talk through the events that went on

the last 3 months that have resulted in a dialog, going forward at

Addis, and about the AU summit. The Sudanese Foreign Minister

Deng Alor, who is from the South and is a member of the SPLM,

in a meeting with Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,

Jendayi Frazer, and I, approached us and gave us the message that

President Bashir and the NCP, and in consultation with the SPLM

members of the National Unity Government, had a series of meetings

and wanted to make an overture to see if it was possible to

have an adjustment of relations with the United States. After consultation

back with Washington, Secretary of State invited Foreign

Minister Deng Alor to come here for a discussion. He did so, along

with Mustafa Ismail, a principal advisor of President Bashir and

a member of the NCP. There were a series of meetings with Deputy

Secretary Negroponte, the Assistant Secretary Frazer, and myself,

and then with Secretary Rice, in which this was explored.

Secretary Rice made absolutely clear that this should not be an

initiative entered into lightly, that we had a trail of broken promises

and broken efforts in the past and any discussion with the

Government of Sudan, and that it would not be good for the Government

of Sudan unless it was a serious effort. They assured us

it was.

After some deliberation, we then proceeded to prepare a document

with specific actionable, verifiable steps. We’ve had lots of

promises about peace and other generalities, stability. The items

we developed, with the help of Kate Almquist and USAID on the

humanitarian side, dealt with specific matters, such as multiple

entry of visas for humanitarian workers, visas within 48 hours,

container in the Port of Sudan released within 7 days, allowing the

corn soy blend product, which is high in nutrition, is used all over

the world to deal with malnutrition of children, and had been prevented

from being allowed into Sudan, that that would be entered,

et cetera.

We sent that paper. And then I traveled to Sudan. I had a series

of meetings in Khartoum; of course, traveled to Darfur, visited a

camp, et cetera, met with UNAMID officers, and in Juba, sat down

with Salva Kiir to review this and to share it before we went up

back to Khartoum to meet with Dr. Nafie and President Bashir and

give them a copy of this nonpaper outlining the sort of things we

would need for any discussion.

And let me emphasize that we said, repeatedly, that we were laying

out a long, tough road that had to be verifiable and progress

on the ground for any better relations. Also let me say that, in my

conversation with President Bashir, he said he was suspicious of

the United States. We’ve had a troubled relationship. They feel

there were certain representations when the CPA was signed in

the DPA that we’ve not followed through on. Of course, we felt it’s

impossible to follow through on them because of the continued violence

in Darfur. But, I also said to him we think the Government

of Sudan lies. There’s going to be nothing taken on faith, nothing

on promises. I referred to my first diplomatic tour during the

Reagan administration, 25 years ago, when President Reagan

called the Soviets the ‘‘Evil Empire.’’ Nonetheless, on nuclear nonproliferation,

we made deals, step by step, verifiable. We were able

to make some progress. And, while on many areas in those days,

we couldn’t, at least in the nonproliferation areas, we built some

bridges and did make some progress.

The Government of Sudan replied, a couple of weeks later, with

their paper, which we—I think I’ll give a—maybe I’m a generous

grader. They got their bat on the ball, they didn’t hit it very far.

We shared it with them. We agreed to have meetings in Paris. We

made clear that past agreements, such as the Joint Communique´

on Humanitarian Issues, the CPA, cease-fire, et cetera, were not

part of these discussions, those were commitments they had to live

up to. We went through the very specific things I’ve alluded to earlier,

and we said if there is change on the ground—we promised

nothing up front, but if there is change on the ground and these

things are happening, which we believe would help alleviate humanitarian

assistance, would contribute to greater stability, then

we would look at taking steps.

Let me emphasize, what we’ve done is outlined, laid out in detail,

a long, tough road to better relations, similar to how Senator Jack

Danforth did when he had—was the President’s Special Envoy to

Sudan, and initiated the talks on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement,

and he laid out what the Government of Sudan must do.

Senator, I wish I could sit here and say I’m optimistic that this

will be fully successful. I also wish I could tell you that, in the foreseeable

future, there’s possibility for peace. There are a lot of bad

actors who have done incomprehensibly evil things to innocent people.

The violence continues. The genocide in slow motion continues.

But, one thing I know is, we can take practical steps to get boots

on the ground. We have done them. I’ll look forward, during the

question-and-answer period to outline them in more detail.

I know we can do a better job of humanitarian assistance. Last

year, the areas accessible for humanitarian assistance have

shrunk. That means more people aren’t getting the aid they got

just a year ago. Even as you mentioned in your opening statement,

90,000 more people have been driven from their homes because of

violence near El Geneina.

We do think a political dialogue is necessary. We support the

United Nations-African Union effort. We also will have our discussions,

which I have talked to rebel leaders, as well as Government

of Sudan officials, and, of course, consultation with the southern

government.

Let me, finally, say, any progress in Darfur is contingent on the

continued implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.

And there have been times it has seemed threatened. It has been

frayed. There were concerns, legitimate concerns it might unravel.

The United States continues to be deeply engaged to try to give

every support it can for that process to continue to keep the Comprehensive

Peace Agreement on track. We’re pleased an arrangement

was worked out between the North and the South so the census

could go forward in a few days. We’re pleased the SPLM will

have its first political convention next month. We’re disappointed

there hasn’t been progress on the Abyei border. We’re disappointed

that there are other issues that remain outstanding, including the

transparency of oil revenue sharing.

But, as you’ve said, Mr. Chairman and other members of this

committee, this is a complex issue. But, I don’t think its complexity

is an excuse for us not to make progress. And I do know progress

will result by getting more boots on the ground. Progress will result

if we can get humanitarian aid to more people. Progress will

result if we work more closely with the French and others on the

joint problem in Chad, in Darfur, where there’s cross-border support,

cross-border travel, and Darfurians, either in IDP camps in

Sudan or in refugee camps in eastern Chad, continue to be terrorized.

Thank you, Chairman Biden and members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

I am grateful for the opportunity to be here with you today to discuss how

the United States is addressing the tragic situation in Darfur and working to support

the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).

The suffering and misery of the Darfur people has gone on too long. The humanitarian

situation is deteriorating. Since the horrific atrocities committed in 2003 and

2004, civilian lives continue to be taken, displaced, or shattered by rape, beatings,

malnutrition, and disease. Since 2003, an estimated 200,000 people have died in

Darfur as a result of this brutal conflict and some 2.5 million people have been displaced.

Countless women have been raped and children have been injured. The

number of killed and displaced persons continues to grow and reflects an atmosphere

of continuing violence.

Civilians who have been forced from their homes and live in internally displaced

persons (IDP) camps are not safe from violence. Women who venture out to gather

wood without escorts are molested, robbed, and raped, while men are abducted and

tortured or murdered. Armed men have been known to enter these camps to either

attack or harass the IDPs.

A December 10, 2006, Save Darfur Coalition Press Release from their Advocates

Rally in the Nations Capital Against Rape and Sexual Violence in Darfur recounted

the horrific experience of a survivor of the violence in Darfur, only one of too many

lives that have been destroyed by this tragedy. She recalled, ‘‘Janjaweed militia and

Government soldiers attacked a primary school for girls, raping the pupils. . . .

Because I told people what happened, the authorities arrested me. They said, ‘we

will show you what rape is.’ They beat me severely. At night, three men raped me.

The following day the same thing, different men. Torture and rape, every day, torture

and rape.’’

In recent months, the security situation on the ground has become increasingly

chaotic. Civilians are caught in the crossfire of rebel groups, armed militia, tribal

groups, and government forces. Villages are desolated, livelihoods destroyed, and

people are either killed or forced from their homes.

Attacks in west Darfur this past February displaced more than 50,000 people, including

an outpouring of more than 13,000 who have crossed into eastern Chad, and

caused over 200 casualties. According to the United Nations (U.N.) Office for the

Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA), nearly 80,000 Darfuris have

been displaced since January 2008. This lack of security in Darfur fuels the humanitarian

crisis by impeding humanitarian operations in Darfur. The priority of the

U.S. Government is to ensure the delivery of life-saving humanitarian assistance to

the more than 2.4 million internally displaced persons and more than 200,000

Darfurian refugees and displaced host populations in eastern Chad.

After renewed clashes over recent months in areas north of El Geneina, west

Darfur, between rebels and the Sudanese Army, there was limited humanitarian access

to the area. Beginning in mid-December 2007, the northern corridor (an area

north of El Geneina that stretches north to Kulbus) was a ‘‘no-go’’ for the U.N. and

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). As a result, humanitarian supplies were

not dispatched to the north until late February of this year. Access to this area was

completely restricted as a result of government-imposed restrictions on the movement

of people, goods, and services after the area fell into the hands of the Chadian

Government-supported Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). OCHA estimated

that a total of 160,000 civilians were affected by this blockade. In addition, on February

20, the Government of National Unity (GNU) Humanitarian Aid Commission

(HAC) cancelled flights in west Darfur for 1 week, significantly limiting NGO access

and ability to respond to humanitarian needs. Flights resumed by March, and although

the situation has improved since that time and some IDPs have begun to

return home, maintaining the delivery of humanitarian assistance remains an urgent

concern. Indeed, accessibility to humanitarian resources remains a concern due

to government and rebel military activity and outright banditry. This means there

is ongoing malnutrition, disease, and deaths.

Despite dangerous conditions, approximately 13,000 humanitarian workers and

embassy staff are doing a remarkable and heroic job. Darfur is currently the largest

humanitarian relief operation in the world, and the United States remains the single

largest donor. In FY 2006 and FY 2007, the U.S. Government contributed over

$1.3 billion to support emergency humanitarian activities in Sudan, including more

than $920 million for Darfur. Since 2005, the United States has provided more than

$4 billion in humanitarian, peacekeeping, and reconstruction assistance to Sudan.

To date, the World Food Programme (WFP) has been able to work at 90 percent

capacity to distribute food aid to the people of Darfur. However, since the beginning

of the year, 60 WFP-contracted trucks have been hijacked in Darfur and 39 trucks

and 26 drivers remain missing, and the WFP has stated it will have to cut its food

distribution by 50 percent for May because of an alarming rise in banditry. The people

of Darfur will not experience long-term progress until there is security on the

ground in Darfur.

The conflict that has created all of this humanitarian suffering has mutated from

the Sudanese Government’s counterinsurgency campaign against new active rebel

groups in Darfur in 2003 which targeted innocent Darfurians with unconscionable

savagery to a situation that is complicated by shifting alliances, growing ambitions,

tribal conflicts, and regional meddling. The Government of Sudan, the Arab militias,

and rebel leaders all have blood on their hands. Make no mistake; this ‘‘genocide

in slow motion’’ continues, casualties mount, and more must be done to alleviate the

terrible humanitarian suffering and bring sustainable stability and peace to this region

brutalized and stained with the blood of innocent people.

Khartoum’s policy in Darfur has been the same tactic they used in the South: To

‘‘divide and destroy.’’ By manipulating tribal divisions, creating militias from Arab

tribes, forcing people from their homes, and separating them from their tribal leaders,

the government has created a lawless environment in Darfur that it can no

longer control.

Renewed clashes between Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Chadian-backed

Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in west Darfur resulted in a major military

campaign by the Government of Sudan. The Sudanese military attacks involved aerial

bombardments by helicopter gunships and fixed-wing aircraft, accompanied by

ground offensives by SAF and militias, the ‘‘devils on horseback.’’ Human rights officers

from UNAMID, the United Nations/African Union (AU) Mission in Darfur,

underscored that these actions failed to distinguish between civilian and military

objects and noted that the scale of destruction of civilian property suggests the damage

was deliberate. A Reuters story quoted a resident of Abu Surug in west Darfur,

saying, ‘‘The helicopters hit us four times and around 20 bombs were dropped. I am

outside the city and can see it burning. They (the attackers) are still inside.’’ There

were also credible accounts of rape committed by armed uniformed men during and

after an attack in Sirba.

The government-supported Janjaweed militias that are responsible for most of the

attacks on civilians have been neither disarmed nor controlled, as outlined in the

Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA). A report by the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner

for Refugees (UNHCR) describes an attack on January 24 in which witnesses

described their attackers as ‘‘Arabs’’ in military uniforms, riding on camels, horses,

and a number of camouflaged military vehicles. The attackers entered the town and

started torching houses and shops and shooting deliberately at people. This style of

fighting mirrors the gruesome attacks by the SAF in 2003 and 2004, indicating

fighting may be reverting back to the 2003/2004 style of engagement. The Washington

Post reported on February 15 a story of a woman who ‘‘had no breast milk

to feed her 5-month-old baby after she spent a week under a tree with no food following

the attack. ‘The Janjaweed came and took everything; our food, our furniture,’

said the 35-year-old mother, who did not know where any of her other six

children or her husband was.’’ As this ongoing conflict mutates, Arab militias not

only support SAF attacks on civilians in Darfur, but also shift alliances, join the

rebels or attack SAF forces in retaliation for not being paid. Their services are available

to the highest bidder.

Government forces and Janjaweed are not the only parties to the conflict in

Darfur inciting violence. In December 2007, JEM forces launched an attack on the

local police station and SAF forces in Silea, a town north of El Geneina. These attacks

prompted harsh counterattacks by SAF forces and started the ongoing fighting

in west Darfur in early 2008 that led to exacerbated humanitarian suffering and

increased the areas that were inaccessible to humanitarian workers.

Because rebel leaders have growing ambitions about wealth and power-sharing,

many of the rebel groups have fragmented due to internal disagreements. The situation

on the ground in Darfur is no longer simply a war between the GOS and rebel

groups. Violent clashes between signatories and nonsignatories of the DPA, inter-

ethnic clashes, banditry and general lawlessness proves this is not a simple war.

It is not only the Government of Sudan that is culpable in the ongoing bloodshed

in Darfur. Some rebels have taken on the role of warlords and even criminals and

are responsible for attacks on civilians. Armed men attack convoys carrying humanitarian

assistance to Darfur, stealing vehicles and kidnapping drivers. NGO compounds

are being looted, and local humanitarian staff are being intimidated.

Quite simply, there is no shortage of bad actors in Sudan: In the Government of

Sudan, among the rebels, and within the militia. I have seen with my own eyes the

tragic consequences of the massive violence in Darfur. When I traveled there in February,

I visited the Al Salam Camp for internally displaced persons and met some

of the innocent victims of this ‘‘genocide in slow motion.’’ I met one beautiful, 10-

year-old girl whose father was killed in an attack on her village 3 years ago. Her

mother and sister rode on a donkey for 19 days before arriving at an IDP camp.

This young girl told me she loved Sharea, the village she left behind. Her days were

happy there. She misses her village, but she does not know if she will ever return

home because ‘‘now it is too dangerous.’’

For this young child and thousands of others, there is little hope. And one thing

seems certain. If we continue on our current path, the numbers will continue to rise.

Despite our empathy for the innocent victims, our condemnation of the aggressors,

our punitive sanctions, and our substantial humanitarian offering, this great tragedy

will go on unabated. Our actions must give meaning to our words—we must

work to create stability and security for the people of Darfur.

The deployment of UNAMID peacekeepers would be a significant step in the right

direction to help change facts on the ground in Darfur. But unfortunately, since the

transition from the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to the African Union/

United Nations peacekeeping operation, UNAMID, there has been little change on

the ground.

Without a doubt, it is a difficult and complex endeavor to coordinate and deploy

a hybrid peacekeeping mission in a country with a strong and often uncooperative

central government. The Government of Sudan has been characteristically obstructionist,

especially with regard to the composition of UNAMID. Earlier this year, engineering

units from Norway and Sweden were rejected by the Government of

Sudan, even though they would have provided vital resources in the transition from

AMIS to UNAMID and helped to quickly create the necessary infrastructure for new

troops. Without the Nordic engineering company, the only engineering unit that has

arrived in Darfur is the advance party from China. These 140 engineers are less

than one-third of the overall engineering assets necessary for the mission—and the

slow deployment of engineers has made it more difficult for UNAMID to receive the

troops necessary to complete their mission.

Unfortunately, many of the obstacles presented by Sudan have been difficult to

pinpoint, and the lack of a ‘‘smoking gun’’ has made it difficult to use the U.N. Security

Council to address these problems. For example, access to land is a critical issue

in Darfur. UNAMID cannot be successful without adequate camp structures, and

the Government of Sudan has delayed the mission’s expansion by limiting access to

land. One of the largest UNAMID headquarters, in Nyala, experienced delays in

construction due to prolonged negotiations with the Government of Sudan, which ultimately

yielded land that was significantly lacking in water resources.

The delays in UNAMID’s deployment are also due in part to a lack of troop contributor

resources. There has been an insufficient pledging of specialized units that

provide critical force multipliers vital to the mission. We have been engaged in an

intense high-level diplomatic campaign to lobby on behalf of the United Nations and

help to generate and deploy tactical and utility helicopters as well as other critical

mission requirements. This diplomatic campaign is starting to bear fruit: Ethiopia

has recently offered helicopters to the mission. Our efforts have also included high level

coordination and outreach to multiple NATO and non-NATO countries, including

China. The United States has worked closely with the U.N. to identify those

countries most likely to contribute helicopters to this operation. Senior U.S. officials,

including the President and Secretary of State, have urged their international counterparts

to provide the required support. In addition to helicopters, it is important

to note that UNAMID also will require additional military transport and logistical

units—these so-called ‘‘enabling’’ units are vital to the creation of the proper infrastructure

and support of a larger peacekeeping mission. These units will help move

materials and personnel to begin the construction of storage, maintenance, and fuel

storage facilities as well as improving security on existing compounds.

In the face of these obstacles, unfortunately, the United Nations has demonstrated

far too little creativity or flexibility in addressing the slow pace of

UNAMID’s deployment. In early March, I met with United Nations Secretary-General

Ban Ki-Moon and Under Secretary General for Peacekeeping Jean-Marie

Gue´henno to discuss my concerns and explore ways to give more urgency to

UNAMID deployment. The United States is focused on practical steps that we and

partner countries can take to assist with deployment. The United States and Canada

have organized a standing committee of partner countries—the Friends of

UNAMID—which meets on a weekly basis in New York to review the status of

UNAMID deployment and address problems as they develop.

The United States has already contributed significant funding for the AMIS and

UNAMID in addition to funding 25 percent of these missions through assessed

peacekeeping dues to the United Nations. Since 2004, the United States has contributed

over $450 million to construct and maintain 34 base camps in Darfur for AMIS

peacekeepers. And during the President’s trip to Africa in February he announced

the U.S. commitment of more than $100 million to assist African nations willing to

step forward for the cause of peace in Darfur. These funds are being used to provide

training and equipment—ranging from personal troop kits to Armored Personnel

Carriers—for Ethiopia, Rwanda, Senegal, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Malawi, and Tanzania.

The training provided by the United States through the African Contingency

Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program includes courses on peacekeeping

with an emphasis on issues such as human rights. The contribution of the

United States to UNAMID has encouraged an additional $59 million worth of support

from countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and

France. Through the Friends of UNAMID group, we are closely coordinating these

efforts.

Together with the United Nations, the Friends of UNAMID group has worked to

speed deployment by addressing problems such as the U.N. practice of placing technical

requirements on Troop Contributing Countries that—in some cases—they are

unable to achieve. The application of these practices would have prevented African

troops from deploying to Darfur. I am pleased to report that the Friends group and

the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) have devised a solution

that will allow troops to deploy as quickly as possible with appropriate training and

equipment. Technical experts will continue to work to ensure that deployment is not

impeded by bureaucratic practices.

The conflict in Darfur must be resolved through a political dialog, and the United

States continues to urge the parties to the conflict to commit to negotiated political

settlement. The United States supports the United Nations/African Union-led peace

process, and we have called for the appointment of a single chief negotiator to provide

leadership and vision to the Joint Mediation Support Team for a successful

pathway to peace. The conflict in Darfur cannot be resolved by a peacekeeping mission

alone. But thus far, Sudanese civilians have not received the protection promised

to them by the United Nations Security Council. We have an obligation to alleviate

their suffering, and increasing UNAMID’s size and capabilities is a step in

the right direction—toward peace and stability. When I returned from my travels

to Sudan in March, I urged UNAMID to focus its efforts on the deployment of an

additional 3,600 African troops by June 1—the scheduled spring deployment of

Egyptian and Ethiopian troops and a rotation of former AMIS battalions. The arrival

of new troops will enable UNAMID to achieve greater stability on the ground

by this summer, and the United States is working with great dedication to make

this objective a reality. The United Nations continues to work with Ethiopia and

Egypt to schedule their deployment. Although those deployment dates have been delayed,

the United States is coordinating with African Troop Contributing Countries,

such as Rwanda and Senegal, to train and equip peacekeepers for rapid deployment

to Darfur. The United States has already delivered equipment for Ethiopian troops

and is pressing forward to provide training and equipment for Rwanda and Senegal

in the first phase of our assistance. We have urged the United Nations to deploy

the Ethiopian troops and rotate new Rwandan soldiers by June, when they will be

prepared for deployment. We are working to ensure that relief arrives quickly, but

ultimately the responsibility lies with the United Nations, Troop Contributing Countries

and donors to meet their deployment targets and deliver on our shared commitments

to the people of Darfur.

In addition to on-the-ground measures to relieve the suffering of the people of

Darfur, I am focusing on steps the United States and international partners can

take to make progress in achieving peace and stability in Darfur and throughout

Sudan. Last week, I held discussions with various parties on these issues in response

to an overture from Khartoum. At the African Union summit in Addis Ababa

in February, Government of Sudan Foreign Minister Deng Alor had raised, with Assistant

Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer and me, a decision by President al-Bashir

to explore the possibility of Sudan and the United States moving toward a path of

constructive engagement. In February, Minister Deng Alor came to Washington to

deliver to Secretary of State Rice a proposal for improving relations between the

United States and Sudan.

I traveled to Sudan in late February to meet with officials from the Government

of Sudan. During the course of our meetings, I provided the Government of Sudan

with a response to their overture, a preliminary outline of specific, verifiable steps

to be taken by the Government of Sudan to increase humanitarian relief to the people

of Sudan, ensure the rapid deployment of UNAMID in order to achieve security

and stability on the ground, and further the implementation of the CPA.

During last week’s meetings, officials from the Government of Sudan and the

United States discussed the Sudanese response to this preliminary proposal for a

work plan. We addressed matters ranging from multiple reentry visas for staff of

nongovernmental organizations to passage of UNAMID equipment through the Port

of Sudan. Some may wonder why the administration is choosing to accept the Government

of Sudan’s overture and attempting engagement with the Government of

Sudan and rebel leaders now, when we have witnessed years of suffering, broken

promises, and a trail of terror and tears. I believe that we cannot take any options

off the table at this point. Let me be clear: There are many bad actors with whom

I have engaged, and I do not forget that for a minute. But as with the CPA, their

engagement may prove critical for progress to be achieved. The cost of human suffering

is simply too high for us to let the Government of Sudan run out the clock.

Instead of standing by and wringing our hands as more lives are destroyed by violence

and displacement, we must seriously consider the full range of actionable options

before us, from further sanctions to muscular actions and everything in between.

This is why I have responded to rebel leaders and to the Government of

Sudan, regardless of their violent history—to determine whether down this road

there exists a path to a sustainable peace in Darfur. Finally, let me be clear. We

will not rely on promises of future actions. Concrete, verifiable, significant progress

must be achieved on the ground before we can contemplate improved relations.

While the tragedy in Darfur demands our greatest focus and energy, we remain

attentive to the CPA, which ended decades of civil war between North and South

and provides the framework through which peace can be achieved and sustained for

all Sudan. In the 3 years since its signing, we have seen great changes in Sudan.

Formerly warring parties have joined together in a Government of National Unity.

There is no more war in the South, and there is no more famine. The Sudan People’s

Liberation Movement (SPLM) established a Government of Southern Sudan

(GOSS) in Juba, as well as 10 state governments throughout the South. $3.5 billion

in oil revenues have been transferred from Khartoum to the GOSS. Roads are being

built. Southerners are returning to help rebuild their homeland. With the support

of the U.S. Government, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) is being transformed

from a rebel force into a professional military body. In FY08 the USG will

provide over $40 million dollars to increase the SPLA’s command and control infrastructure,

advise its senior officers as they produce a Defense White Paper, and provide

training to build institutional and strategic capacity. These efforts are intended

to act as a security guarantee to prevent either party of the CPA from abrogating

the agreement, as well as transform the SPLA into a smaller, disciplined, and defensively

oriented organization.

On my recent trip to Juba, I met with GOSS President Salva Kiir to hear his

views and concerns about the CPA. Implementation of the CPA faces many challenges.

Last week’s initial decision by the GOSS to unilaterally delay their portion

of the census, an important milestone in the CPA, was cause for dismay, though

I welcome the decision of the National Congress Party (NCP) and SPLM to work

together to reach a compromise to follow through on the census, delayed by only a

week. The issue of border demarcation in the oil-rich Abyei region remains a sensitive

issue, and Abyei could spark renewed hostilities. Therefore it is urgent that

the CPA parties find a solution to the Abyei border issue. At the same time, the

parties’ recent decision to allow the U.N. Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to monitor

Abyei for 2 weeks demonstrates their interest in avoiding new violence. The continuing

lack of full transparency in the oil sector also is a concern, as is the failure

of the parties to withdraw their military forces from the North/South border in accordance

with the timeline stipulated in the CPA. The parties themselves bear the

ultimate responsibility to resolve these difficult issues, but U.S. encouragement and

engagement concerning implementation of other CPA commitments will remain crucial

for progress to be made in Sudan. And here I want to acknowledge the continuing

and heroic work of U.S. Embassy Khartoum and Consulate Juba staff, including

the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development

(USAID), and other agencies, in making this happen.

I stress the importance of the CPA not only because of the need to prevent a resurgence

of war with Southern Sudan. If the CPA unravels, the tragic North/South

civil war could reignite and our opportunities for peace in Sudan would disappear.

Beyond that, it is helpful to consider Darfur from the wider perspective of the problems

facing Sudan overall. We see through census efforts in Darfur that the citizens

of that region are skeptical of the relevance of the CPA to their own political struggle.

This reminds us that the importance of the CPA must be underscored across

Sudan, not only in the South. Moreover, although this is an oversimplification of the

matters, the conflict between North and South and that in Darfur both stem, at

least in part, from problems in the central government’s treatment of marginalized

sections of Sudan. The CPA addressed the problem of marginalization of the South.

We should be working to similarly address the marginalization of Darfur. Moreover,

if rebels in Darfur see the Government of Sudan implementing a peace agreement,

they might believe that a similar path might be achieved to secure peace in Darfur.

Similarly, our continuing pressure on the parties to implement the CPA shows the

international community’s continuing support for the agreements it encouraged, facilitated,

and guaranteed.

And the relationship operates in the opposite direction as well: Continued violence

in Darfur threatens implementation of the CPA. Without peace in Darfur, it will be

extremely difficult to pull off the 2009 nationwide elections called for in the CPA.

Today, we are witnessing the impact of insecurity in Darfur on preparations for the

census, another milestone under the framework of the CPA. We must not let the

tragedy in Darfur displace the attention we must also give to the crucial matter of

peace in the rest of the country, and we must not address one crisis without informing

our perspective with the lessons of the other. They are not separate issues; instead,

they go hand in hand.

The U.S. Government is committed and is acting to end the suffering of the people

of Darfur. We are committed to doing this by providing humanitarian assistance,

by creating security and stability on the ground, and by pushing for implementation

of the CPA. Only with sustained focus and creativity will we end this tragedy that

has already gone on far too long.

The innocent people of Sudan have suffered too much, and too many continue to

suffer. It is unconscionable. We must be forward-leaning in pursuit of any and every

avenue to alleviate human suffering, bring sustainable stability on the ground, and

move to real peace. In that the American people, the President, and Congress are

in agreement.

Again, thank you for allowing me to be here today and participate in this hearing

on an issue about which we all care so much.

The no-fly zone is the concern. But, let

me—let Kate speak for herself, and let me answer as well as I can.

I think the array of options that you’ve mentioned, and more punitive

steps, are legitimate things. We are trying—I have tried, in

my new capacity, to move so they’re actionable options for the

President to consider, from the most muscular to more punishing

sanctions. As you know, the U.S. has gone further with unilateral

sanctions, the divestment bill, et cetera. We are trying to explore

ways to change that behavior and incentives. And I think it’s a dialog

that the Congress certainly has a right to express its strong

views on.

Thank you for your comments.

I think the first difference is, we are engaged in a different way,

both with the United Nations and in training African peacekeepers.

Before this began, just 21⁄2 months ago, there was no prospect for

any foreseeable deployment, except a few hundred more.

Sir, I don’t think they can do a veto

of——

I think there was a lack of sense of urgency

on all parties, leading up to the transfer. I think that there

was a extra challenge, because there had been an agreement that

it would be predominantly an African-troop-filled force, and there

was a lack of capacity in many of the African countries for peacekeeping.

I was in northeastern Sierra Leone when Nigeria had its

first peacekeepers there, in 2002. They have learned an enormous

amount. Nigeria is now quite good. We had many countries without

the capacity. That’s why President Bush stepped forward, made a

$100-million commitment and—for training and equipping African

forces. And we’re now working with Ethiopia, Rwanda, Senegal,

Ghana, Burkina Faso, and Mali——

It’ll take—well, could I just say two

things——

Quick? What was—one of

the things important in the resolution passed last July, it was

under chapter VII, which means the peacekeepers can be more robust.

It’s not just a monitoring force.

Second, we do have a deployment

schedule that we’ve pushed and worked with through the U.N., and

I can go through it very quickly, but the bottom line is, we’ll have

about an increase of 6,500 more troops by the end of this year, solely—

because of our African partners and the U.S. assistance in

training and equipping.

Sir——

We will have the troops

trained. We will have the troops——

Ready to deploy. Right

now, the U.N. does not have the capacity to absorb them.

They’re——

They have a budget of $1.28 billion——

12 months to go——

End of June, they’ve

only——

Spent 26 percent.

They have camps, and they haven’t

spent——

On camps, sir. Right now, the camps

they have, the United States paid for. We——

Yes, sir.

We will have trained 9,200——

65 new ones.

Yes.

Yes, sir. I’d say there’s been a change,

both because of the U.S. being more proactive, but also I wanted

to give credit to Secretary General Ban Ki-moon——

Who has personally gotten

more involved and been forward-leaning and helpful.

And let me just, if I could, sir, briefly—

one of the mechanisms we’ve put together that’s been enormously

helpful is a Friends of UNAMID Group, chaired by the Canadians

and ourselves——

With 14 other countries,

who can give assistance. And let me just give you one example.

One of the difficulties is, most of these African countries have

never negotiated an MOU for deployment. We’ve broken them up.

So, Senegal—France has adopted, if you will, is working with them,

helping them with the negotiations. These are the kind of needless

impediments that we have tried to get through, and I think we’re

going to be successful.

I think there’s a few things. One, we

have to have serious discussions with President Deby and the Chad

Government to stop their support of the JEM, which, in turn, are

initiating military offensives which the government then responds

in a totally disproportionate way, killing innocent civilians, creating

the rapes, the burnings of villages, et cetera.

Increasing.

Second, we have to try to put pressure on those countries that

Sudan listens to more carefully than they do us.

It would be nice.

Um——

Senator, believe me, that’s a question

that I go to bed with every night. It’s unbelievable, in the 21st century,

that a genocide in slow motion like this could continue as long

as it has. I give great credit to the American people, so many of

whom have been engaged and moved and activated, and their representatives

in Congress. And I can tell you, the reason I accepted

this job—and it’s reaffirmed every time I’m in the Oval Office—is

how deeply President Bush feels about it.

I do not think the U.N. is incompetent. I have worked it in many

diplomatic and other capacities over the last 25 years. The U.N. is

a useful tool in the United States foreign-policy toolbox. But,

often—indeed, perhaps usually—it cannot be the only tool to solve

a problem.

I do think one area where they make a significant contribution

is in peacekeeping. I do think, notwithstanding the frustrations

and difficulties, deployment of UNAMID will make a significant

difference on the ground. One of the institutional weaknesses is

that any of the five permanent members can slow and delay and

create obstructions for rapid movement. We are seeing some of

that. We’re seeing quite a bit of that.

But, I also, looking at the tough peacekeeping missions in conflict

areas, like Sierra Leone, like Timor-Leste, like eastern Congo—

they are tough missions. And I think the commitment of the Secretary

General is going to be enormously helpful, and I’m glad he

was—he allowed me to meet with him and continue to communicate

with him. I think Ban Ki-moon is making a difference in

those that are working for him. But, it’s frustrating, because it’s

slow.

I think there’s no question that the United States cares. You see

that in the citizen involvement. You see that in the humanitarian

assistance, that Kate knows better than I. You see that in our effort

to try to move the political situation, like the effort of Senator

Danforth for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. But, it’s devilishly

difficult, because there’s bad actors who see the current level

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of violence acceptable. And when you see the victims of this death,

destruction, devastation, and deep despair, it’s hard to understand

how any human can be cold to their plight. But, they are. And so,

we have to try to create different facts on the ground, pressure

them, change the dynamics so they see it in their self-interest

they’re better moving toward peace, like they did in the Comprehensive

Peace Agreement.

But, Senator, I don’t see a short-term victory, but we cannot divert

our attention.

I don’t know why I couldn’t take care

of that 3 months ago. No, sir, it’s very—let me first say, the biggest

problem with UNAMID is not helicopters. And I’ll get to that. It’s

getting more boots on the ground. And we are doing——

It wouldn’t be in the top three or four

issues.

It’s a legitimate——

Question.

I think that’s part of it. It’s also because

countries like Jordan, which came up with six helicopters,

and India, that came up with three helicopters, ultimately the U.N.

rejected, because it didn’t quite fit. We’re encouraging them to be

more flexible.

Yes, sir.

They’ve obligated more now, which is a good thing. But, we think

we have suggested they could be more forward-leaning in using

that money to construct camps, to be able to create water availability,

to work on different aspects of sustainability. And, I will

say, there has been progress since 3 months ago. I think it’s, in

part, because of the United States, more because of the joint effort

of the 14 countries that are friends of UNAMID, and also because,

instead of talking about generalities, we’ve rolled up our sleeves

and gotten into each specific item, and then tried to find a solution.

So, there’s—it’s making progress, but it’s been difficult. A lot more

needs to be done.

It’s a very fair question. Let me make

two observations and then defer to Kate, because one of the concerns

is humanitarian community, who have been reluctant for us

to take certain steps, because it would interfere with the delivery

of humanitarian aid. First——

I’m sorry.

It’s the no-fly zone.

UNAMID’s ability——

They can create impediments, and

they have. And we’re working both with them and through the——

Predominant African Union—African——

Sir, if the last observation is correct,

I’m unaware of it.

I am aware that the—as the chairman

referred to, the Norwegian and Swedish engineers that would have

helped speed the deployment were stopped. This was based on an

agreement in Addis Ababa before the passing the United Nations

Security Council Resolution for UNAMID. I was not part of those

talks. I don’t know what went into them. But, there was an agreement,

before, that was part of the arrangement for the U.N. Security

Council to pass that.

Is that a problem? Absolutely, sir.

That is right, sir.

United States is trying——

The United States is trying to fight

that. We’ve tried to get the P-5 to agree to be more vigorous to

force their acceptance. I’ve discussed this with the Government of

Sudan. I am hopeful that we will get the deployment of the Thais

and Nepalese. Your criticisms have a lot of merit, and I wish that

the Addis agreement that gave them unusual leverage on what

they could accept had not been made. Senator, I was not in Addis,

I was not in the government during that time.

Yes, sir.

Yes, sir.

For Zimbabwe, I think was——

Yes, sir.

We do.

Yes.

Yeah. Can I give you one example of

the type of problem, just to elaborate on what you’ve raised?

Yesterday, there was a discussion in the Security Council about

benchmarks, to put more pressure for more rapid deployment. The

Chinese position was twofold; yes, it would be good to have more

rapid deployment, but, no, let’s not put pressure on, benchmarks

are counterproductive.

Senator, we need to be forward-leaning within the Security

Council and elsewhere. Currently, there’s an embargo on weapons

sales to Darfur. Not to Sudan. So, there are weapon sales. Some

reports indicate they’ve diminished—but, nonetheless, continue—

through the Port of Sudan. Once they’re in country, your imagination

is as good as mine to where they end up.

We have a complicated and large and broad relationship with

China. Speaking for my responsibility, I continue to be disappointed

that China doesn’t have greater concern about the people

that are suffering in Darfur and are not more proactively helpful

to us.

I believe the Congress has discussed a variety of things. The administration

raises this, and engages with China. And we remain

hopeful that their behavior will become more proactive and constructive.

Yes, sir; that’s my understanding.

Weapons are available.

Thank you, Senator.

As the chairman indicated earlier, we offered, and would continue

to have an open-ended offer, for a briefing with the committee

with the classified documents so you could see them and review

them and ask any questions you want. Yes, sir. There’s no

reason for us not to want that transparency. Indeed, there are reasons

for us to want it, because the press report last week is not

accurate and raised legitimate concerns. If it were accurate, I could

not defend it and would not have engaged in it. So, transparency,

where you know what’s going on, is a good thing, so you’re informed.

You’re elected representatives with great responsibility and

should have access. That offer’s been made. It continues on the

table. And I’ll look forward to—when it is convenient, to provide

such a briefing, sir.

The bad actors—almost anyone I’ve

dealt with——

Among——

Among the Government of

Sudan leadership, have been engaged in supporting——

I can identify the people I met with,

if that’s what you are seeking.

Dr. Nafie, Mr. Ghosh, and I can provide

you with a list of all the attendees in those discussions. I’ve

also met with President Bashir. I have had meetings with rebels,

both leaders and movement. I have not had any contact, and don’t

know, right now, how I would, with one of the worst bad actors,

and that is these Arab militias, some of which under the control

of the government, some of which are not. But, I think, like Jack

Danforth found, if you’re going to try to see if there’s possibility for

political dialog in this neighborhood, you’re going to talk to bad actors.

There’s been a discussion between the

committee staff and the State Department, trying to work that out,

and hopefully we could.

We had initially suggested right after

this hearing, but that——

We were told that wouldn’t be——

I don’t know what the swing was that

changed the Government of Sudan to move toward the January

2005 decision to sign the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. We can

speculate, but I don’t know.

I don’t know if this will be such a decision.

But, I do think, while we’re pursuing the other things—

changing facts on the ground with greater security, changing the

accessibility of humanitarian assistance, trying to create a political

dialogue, including the rebels, trying to work on the Chad-Darfur

bleed-in—that if they say, ‘‘This door’s open,’’ we should test it.

But, it is only in the context of making clear that we’re laying out

a long and tough and difficult road to any better relations, and only

changes the facts on the ground will warrant any adjustment——

Of that relationship.

Sir, it’s something—most recently, a

few hours ago, I talked to Ambassador Jan Eliasson, who’s the

U.N.—along with Dr. Salim from the AU. It’s something they’re

aware of and something that, on a relatively frequent basis, probably

at least every 2 weeks, we talk about. Before I have discussions

like this, I talk to Jan. Before he travels to the region, he

talks to me.

Yes, sir.

Yes, sir.

Sure. Sir, as I said earlier, I believe,

even more profoundly now, that the continued implementation of

the CPA is instrumental for a chance for any progress in Darfur.

Furthermore, as you know, that civil war, which began in 1958, 2

years after independence, and except for an brief intermission in

the seventies and early eighties, went on for over 50 years and

killed more than 2 million people and displaced more than 4 million.

We cannot—they cannot afford for that to unravel. And, beyond

that, sir, I’d suggest to you that that’s one of the achievements

of U.S. leadership during the last—during this administration

and to Senator Danforth.

What are the keys? The census was very important. The fact that

the North and South were able, despite disappointments with respect

to the forms that were printed,—insecurity in Darfur, that

was an important test. A compromise was reached. The census is

going forward.

We’re going to have a big test with respect to the 2009 election.

And, of course, the ultimate issue is the 2011 referendum.

Meantime, issues of transparency on oil revenue continue to

plague and cause trouble which isn’t necessary. And, finally, there

has to be resolution of the Abyei border issue.

All that said, the good work being done, because of the United

States people and USAID, to create political institutions in the

South—and the SPLM’s first convention is going to be in May, and

the various arms of the National Endowment of Democracy are actively

involved in helping that—helping economic viability and

independence—this is an agriculturally rich area, it should be a

breadbasket, it should be able to have a certain independence in

trading with itself, and it doesn’t even have roads. There are things

we can and should do to strengthen the South, which is part and

parcel of successful implementation of the CPA, and cannot separated

from getting peace in Darfur.

Mr. Senator, first let me say, as you

know, President Bush wants to help the suffering people in Sudan.

It’s a deep commitment and strong belief of his, which is why we’re

initiating so many different avenues to try to make progress.

Second, you have to understand those with whom you are talking.

And I believe we have an understanding of the history, reliability,

and experience of those to whom we talk, whether it happens

to be members of the Government of Sudan, rebel movements,

or the South. And to not test an overture that might change the

dynamic would be a shortsighted decision, as long as we’re disciplined

and only act if there are positive results on the ground.

And, finally, with respect to the state sponsor of terrorism, you

are absolutely correct, the only criterion on whether a country

should be on that list or off that list is on the merits of the issue

of whether or not they’re supporting or engaged in terrorism. And

that will not change as a result of these discussions. And it’s up

for the members of our United States intelligence community, who

I’m sure would be happy to discuss with you their views, but that

would not be done until they were comfortable that all the substantive

criteria had been met.

We are not going to hold out that, separate from the substantive

issues that have to be dealt with on whether or not terrorism is

being sponsored.

Sir, I would suggest—I’m doing what

I can—I’d suggest you can offer to——

Ask that question——

To the Defense Department.

It’s a question I have raised.

Question I’ve raised.

Question I’ve raised.

Senator, first let me say I think it’s an

incorrect characterization to say that we’re not doing anything with

respect to trying to deploy UNAMID, and I’ve tried to outline many

initiatives. I think your questions on the helicopters are fair, but

that does not mean we’re not trying to lead and not do anything.

Second, the major source of small arms, as I understand it, is the

Chinese.

There is an embargo for arms to

Darfur, yes, sir.

Yes, sir.

That the arms end up, or some of

those arms end up in Darfur, is a legitimate area of great concern.

To the best of my knowledge, we don’t have the intelligence of a

direct transfer of the arms that are sold to the Government of

Sudan to Darfur. The issue might be, Should that embargo be widened?

But, at least technically, they come into the country in sales

to the Government of Sudan, which is not covered by the embargo.

Sir, first let me say we appreciate your

deep interest, and continued interest, in Sudan and your leadership

in the Senate. And, in fact, if I were trying to placate the Government

of Sudan, I would have agreed with your letter. So, I think

the concerns you raise are legitimate.

What we’re pursuing is laying out a long, tough road to better

relations, which means living up to existing commitments on the

Joint Communique´ on Humanitarian Assistance, living up to the

commitments on the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, living up to

commitments on the Darfur Peace Agreement, living up to commitments

they’ve made to the U.N. with respect to deployment of

UNAMID. Then, and only then, we start going through a list of a

variety of steps to ensure rapid and full deployment of UNAMID

so that it can contribute to security on the ground, and a number

of steps to allow greater access, more security, and improved humanitarian

aid getting to those in IDP camps and refugee camps.

Sir, we have made clear, we will not trade promise for promise.

We’ve done that before. And the history shows that they cannot be

trusted.

We have said, in these discussions, these are specific steps, each

one of them is verifiable, they have to be performed, and there has

to be progress on the ground, at which time we’ll address other

issues. But, it is a long, difficult road, and it has to be traveled before

the issues you raised can be seriously discussed.

I’m confirming we’ve made the offer,

and when it’s accepted, we’ll be here. Yes, sir.